this question, to postulate firm grounds and criteria from which protocols of interpretation could be established. Idealism, mimeticism, expressivism, and other systematic approaches to this problem have been proposed as solutions and continue to inform critical practice still. Nevertheless, none has carried the day, and the variability of aesthetic experience remains. As Hazard Adams (1971: 5) concedes in his influential anthology Critical Theory since Plato, ''a case can be made that the history of critical theory is one of cyclical error. '' At the same time, these interpretive and methodological dilemmas have a special character in our contemporary setting. In scholarly fields as diverse as our own specializations-early modern culture and film studies-a widespread trend has emerged consisting in the privileging of the historical record as corrective to the vagaries of interpretation and the allegedly unproductive reflexivity that is often associated with the influence of French intellectual thought-especially that of Jacques Derrida, Jacques Lacan, and Michel Foucault but also of Jean-François Lyotard, Jean Baudrillard, Giles Deleuze, and Félix Guattari-on the literary and cultural theory of the 1970s and 1980s. 1 As a field whose formation in many ways coincided with the rise of such theory in the humanities, film studies' turn from theory is instructive in this regard. In a report on the annual meeting of the Society for Cinema Studies in 2000, Sean Griffin (2001: 1-2) noted the contrast between the 1999 plenary session and that of 2000. While in 1999, speakers cast an almost nostalgic picture of the ''high moment'' in film theory (ca. the late 1960s and 1970s), and practically bemoaned the ''end of theory'' in cinema studies . . . the 2000 plenary seemed almost a rebuttal of the glum warnings. . . . All of the speakers grounded their comments in a welcome pragmatic approach to what opportunities there are currently in the academy. . . . The concreteness of the topics grounded the plenary in materialist concerns.
While the attractiveness of pragmatic scholarly projects (i.e., solvable research questions) seems undeniable, the question of whether or not there was reason to lament the demise of ''theory'' remains. The turn toward history-toward the material, or the thing-does not so much settle the problems that concerned theory as attempt to evade them.
We see this clearly in the emergence and aftermath of New Historicism in American cultural theory.The succession of New Historicism by even more 1. This trend away from theory and toward a re-grounding of literary and cultural theory is visible in publication patterns and job announcements and has even been picked up on in the popular press, which tends to frame the challenge to theory as a return to ''beauty.'' On the renewed interest in objects and materiality in historical criticism, see Brown 2001 , McQuillan 1999 , Wesseling 1996 , de Grazia et. al. 1996 , and Fish 1995 ; on the return of beauty, see Soderholm 1997 , Scarry 1999 , Heller 1998 , and Rosenbaum 2000 strictly materialist approaches raises a concern that the gains of the previous historical turn may have resulted in an idealization of its object, the thing. Paradoxically, this results in reanimating the methodological concerns that were seemingly laid to rest with the declaration that ''the era of big theory is over''-as the New York mes's Emily Eakin announced in an article entitled ''The Latest Theory Is That Theory Doesn't Matter' ' (2003) . 2 As antinomial options for guiding critical practice, then, there is little to choose between thing and theory. Quite the contrary, there is every reason not to choose between them.
Adams's admission of error's prominent role in the history of critical theory may be taken to ironize critical practice, generally, and metacritical claims, particularly, in the present. However, the relativism become fatalism that results from such a move-why interpret, or adjudicate interpretations, if all is error?-only makes sense if one first assumes that the purpose of critical thought is to answer conclusively the question of what constitutes the persistent demand that aesthetic works place on us: Why and how do we continue to engage with the aesthetic? Any conclusive answer to these questions-whether regarding the aesthetic's productive relation to social cohesion or its entirely private pleasures-are necessarily incomplete and, therefore, by definition erroneous. Further, framing the value of critical positions as matters of truth or falsity may lead inevitably to a deep pessimism about the scholarly enterprise. We submit that a more interesting and productive view of critical theory's long history rereads the predominance of error as the persistence of the aesthetic work's call for engagement. Precisely the partial, provisional, and potentially incorrect nature of our responses to this demanded engagement-a result of the recognition that we exist only as ethical subjects insofar as we are susceptible to the demands of other consciousnesses-provides the generative matrix of productive and revisionary thought about aesthetic works, the methods by which we understand them, and (finally) ourselves. From this perspective, fidelity to the inexhaustible possibilities of the aesthetic removes critical thought from a framework of understanding in which progress is measured in definitive terms of success or failure. Attentiveness and adaptability, not certainty or even conclusiveness, become the goals of critical thought.
This focus on engagement with the aesthetic guides the particular contributions to ''Between Thing and Theory.'' The result is an overall project that attempts to intervene in contemporary critical discourse in four important ways. First, we seek not to resurrect theoretical abstraction for its own sake, but to insist on the relevance of theoretical questions to critical thought even and especially in an era of historicist criticism. Second, we seek not to deny the urgency of history, but to insist that the tendency to appeal to context and causality as grounds for analysis and interpretation may tend to reduce objects of great symbolic density and complexity to the object status of evidence, in an operation Lyotard (1984: xxiv) rightly calls ''terroristic.'' Thirdly, and most importantly, we seek neither to reinstate nor to denigrate an approach to interpretation that privileges aesthetic form (e.g., poetics or narrative stylistics) over content (e.g., ideology or sociological phenomena) or context (e.g., historical moments of creation or reception) in the hopes of avoiding the pendulum swings of intellectual fashion. Quite the opposite, we hope to reclaim and reanimate the category of the aesthetic as a site and practice for cognitive and ethical revisionism. As such, the aesthetic properly describes that transformative space in between the poles of prescriptive abstraction and materialist description. Rather than reducing the questions of ''Between Thing and Theory'' by means of one or another critical method, we seek to locate in the actual dynamic relation between thing and theory a challenging of method per se and, by extension, an opportunity for the reformulation of thought and action in light of the aesthetic's potential refusal of the antinomic binarism of instrumental thought.Thus, while the issue is organized around questions of method, the methods actually advanced will necessarily be provisional and self-critical, works in progress rather than templates for efficient reproduction. Finally, ''Between Thing and Theory'' seeks to redirect a recent trend in which the cyclical movement of critical discourse is being written as progress-specifically, from an apparent focus on methodological reflexivity to an apparent focus on material contexts and objects.
Roland Barthes (1972: 112) famously quipped that ''a little formalism turns one away from History,'' while ''a lot brings one back to it.'' Although we ultimately have no interest in opposing history and form, it is both tempting and instructive to extend Barthes's maxim a bit further. To wit: a little history turns one away from form, while a lot brings one back to it. This expanded formula permits a perspective on the emergence, preeminence and recession of broadly defined critical methods in humanistic study in the latter half of the twentieth century, as they have tended in their concentrations to oscillate between context and text, between signified and signifier, between the diachronic and the synchronic, between thing and theory. Any generalization that claims a purchase on such a sweep of intellectual history necessarily focuses more on the forest than particular trees. However, the existence of alternatives and divergences from the pattern we detect in the present and trace to the past-which, for instance, Douglas Brooks finds in the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer, James Knapp in Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Jeffrey Pence in Stanley Cavell-does not weaken the credibility or usefulness of ''between thing and theory'' as a heuristic trope.This is the case since we seek not merely to identify this tendency to oppose an uncritical reflexivity (identified with theoretical practice) and a verifiable materiality (usually offered as a more grounded alternative) in critical practice but to transform it.
Materialist criticism, with its tendency to impute causality to context in settling aesthetic questions, may in its contemporary extremes become a preformulated-and prescriptive-method. Likewise, the highly selfreflexive practice of earlier theory and criticism (such as deconstruction or psychoanalysis) may lead to methodological prescription. Theoretical reflection may become a reflex, less meditative reconsideration than programmatic self-reference. The result is often the production of familiar interpretive language, or as noted apostate of high theory Frank Lentricchia sums it up: ''Tell me your theory and I'll tell you in advance what you'll say'' (quoted in Delbanco 1999: 33 n. 5). Both thing-and theory-centered approaches to the aesthetic thus share more than might be expected-specifically, a tendency toward instrumental methodology.
By ''a little formalism'' we take Barthes to mean the structuralist analysis of signification. Although structuralism is typically seen in distinction from the focus on aesthetic form that characterized literary study influenced by figures like F. R. Leavis in Britain or such New Critics as John Crowe Ransom in the United States or the analysis of the special qualities of poetic language derived from the work of Roman Jakobson and other Russian Formalists, all these approaches share two important features. The first is a commitment to the formal features of aesthetic texts as the primary, if not exclusive, subject of interpretation. Whether building up from particular cases-the ''close readings'' central to New Critical pedagogy and research, for example-or working down from the establishment of general principles of poetic form-the work of Jakobson, Jan Mukařovský, and others-these approaches share an interest in the project of ''analyzing language as if it had its own life or is itself a system'' (Adams 1971: 4) . In their different ways, and within different institutional and social contexts, these approaches also share in an overt rejection of what is now called ''old historicism,'' a practice dependent, in Jean Howard's (1987: 13) description, on a conception of history as ''a realm of retrievable fact.'' 3 Though now unfash-3. Howard's (1987: 13-14) characterization comes in the context of her discussion of the differences between the ''old'' and ''new'' historicism, which she sums up as a matter of ''the issue of what one conceives history to be: a realm of retrievable fact or a construct made up of textualized traces assembled in various configurations by the historian/interpreter. '' ionable, this orientation toward historical context has taken various forms in literary and cultural study, ranging from the examination of great authors as epitomizing the themes and styles of unified and coherent epochs, philology, and even the politicized realism of American Marxist critics of the 1930s.The subsequent concern with the functionality of language, a poetics that might or might not be restricted to a category of the literary, challenged critical practices dependent on a fundamental assumption of referentiality. Instead, the formal coherence of a work was placed at the center of critical attention-whether a text's own internal and autonomous organization (as with Cleanth Brooks's ''heresy of paraphrase''), or its exclusive identity as the articulation of codes or rules of signification (from Jakobson through semiotics)-effectively, if not intentionally, bracketing the connections of this work to historical and social contexts as then understood.
In its early manifestoes, such as Derrida's 1965 ''Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,'' poststructuralism seemingly heralded a great break with structuralism's account of the workings of the symbolic realm as a complex but ultimately decipherable system. While the appearance of deconstruction is often cited as the inaugural moment of an era of textuality, the insistence that referentiality was not simply a process but a problem to be puzzled over and deferred is perhaps better understood as the culmination of twentieth-century philosophy's concern with language, established by Richard Rorty in his collection The Linguistic Turn (1967; see also Rorty 1979) . The transition poststructuralism indicated, then, was from a little formalism to a lot. And a lot of formalism is another way to describe the ''paradigm-defining concept that textuality was for the 1970s'' (Buell 1999: 7) . In turn, the centrality of textuality in this period, which Geoffrey Harpham more generally locates from 1965-1980, rendered it ''the Age of Theory'' (Harpham 1995: 387) or what David Scott Kastan (1999: 31) calls ''the great age of theory.'' We can read Barthes's maxim quoted above, then, as predicting the plummeting fortunes of formalism when its tendencies toward methodological abstraction and apparent disconnection-or at least attenuated and troubled connection-with historical circumstances become too great. 4 If Adams admits that knowing the history of critical thought may produce a degree of frustration about its claims and project, Barthes suggests that the most elaborated and sophisticated of formalisms, the reflexive textuality of theory, may seem to embody frustration itself. Coincident with the rise of projects of cultural analysis linked explicitly to historical and con-temporary political struggles, the urge to cut the Gordian knot of theory's relentless questioning of referentiality produced a drift, then a turn, and more recently valedictions. However one dates the dominance of the paradigm of textuality, and without presuming its sudden disappearance, critical practice in cultural study has clearly been carried on under the aegis of a paradigm of historicism since the 1980s, signified most boldly by Fredric Jameson's opening exhortation to The Political Unconscious in 1981: ''Always historicize!'' (9; see also Buell 1999: 7; Andrew 2000: 347) . In the 23 May 2003 edition of the Chronicle of Higher Education, Morris Dickstein (2003: B7) writes that ''one of the momentous developments in criticism in the past two decades has been the revival of the historical method as a way of studying literature, the arts, and the world of ideas.'' Moreover, the turn to history has been fashioned as a reaction against theoretical abstraction and difficulty. Dickstein's account of theory's day, when a ''skeptical approach to all interpretation . . . under the influence of Michel Foucault, Roland Barthes, and a rediscovered Marxism'' fostered a ''hermeneutic self-consciousness,'' fashions it as a thing of the past (ibid.: 2). It has become commonplace to announce the end of the entire project of theory, a pronouncement to be found in such diverse venues as Thomas Docherty's manifesto for PostMarxism After Theory (1997) Theory (1999) .
Post-Theory seeks to sever the lingering dependence of film studies on ''Grand Theories'' of subjectivity, representation, and power. Bordwell and Carroll are most critical of theoretical endeavors that seek to, or are taken to, establish doctrines that will determine the direction and success of all future research projects. These universalizing tendencies are certainly present in the theoretical tradition of film studies, but so are their critiques. For instance, psychoanalytic accounts of spectatorial experience have been considered as universals and challenged by critics who identify dimensions of the viewing experience that are ostensibly limited to localized cultures, audiences, and times. 5 Therefore, to identify the entire project of film theory 5. A famous example would be Laura Mulvey, whose enormously influential ''Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema' ' (1989a [1975] ) established a broadly reproducible, if not universal, model of the unequal pleasures and powers offered gendered viewers by the conventions of popular narrative cinema. Despite its wide acceptance and application, Mulvey's model came under criticism for its presumption to explain all viewing experiences across different cultural groupings and even within the idiosyncrasies of individual negotiations of gender identity and pleasure. Significantly, Mulvey herself contributed to the reevaluation and revision of her model in ''Afterthoughts on 'Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema ''' (1989b [1981] ), which argued for more nuanced possibilities for female spectators than the victimization that prevailed in her original essay.
with the fundamentalist application of doctrine by some scholars seems to mistake a recurring temptation in academic work for a problem unique to film studies. Conformity, imitation, and the reproduction of method are problems in all areas of scholarship. The baby of theoretical speculation about interpretive method and goals seems to be getting tossed out with the bathwater of instrumental and doctrinaire practice. In this desire, PostTheory shares something with the politically and historically oriented brand of cinema studies that has come to overwhelmingly dominate discourse in the field and that Bordwell and Carroll otherwise wish to distance themselves from-namely, ''a distaste for French film theory'' (Andrew 2000: 346) . It may be argued that the strong links between cinema studies and French film theory-from Bazinian realism and the auteurism of Cahiers du Cinema to the complex alchemy of Althusserian Marxism and Lacanian psychoanalysis practiced by such figures as Jean-Louis Baudry and JeanLouis Comolli-helped solidify film studies' position as a discrete discipline with an object and language all its own; more positively, it may be argued, as Dudley Andrew (2000) has done, that the project of film theory remains valid in its own terms. Against either such view, that film theory derived from French sources was strategically useful or an autonomously legitimate concern, Bordwell and Carroll suggest that the period of ''Grand Theory'' is an anomaly best gotten past.
Against the previous era's apparent rejection of even the most careful work dependent to some extent on referentiality, they advance the cause of projects devoted to cinema's identifiable historical and material dimensions as well as its models of cognitive address and reception. As a result of their basis in empirical method, cognitive psychology's models of interpretive activity are valorized as a more tractable and verifiable account of viewer psychology than film theory's most cherished Grand Theory, psychoanalysis:
Had imaginative historians and rigorous theorists not ignored charges of ''positivism'' and ''empiricism,'' we would not have most of the promising avenues that currently lie open. In the Post-Theory era, sharply focused, in-depth inquiry remains our best bet for producing the sort of scholarly debate that will advance our knowledge of the cinema. Grand Theories come and go, but research and scholarship will remain. (Bordwell and Carroll 1996: 29-30) The valorization of rigor against ''Grand Theory'' also drives the rise of cognitive psychology in literary studies. Consider, for example, the recent call for ''rigorous'' attention to narrative by Marisa Bortolussi and Peter Dixon in their book Psychonarratolo : Foundations for the Empirical Study of Literary Response (2003: 26) :
One such myth [that has delayed the emergence of psychonarratology] is the objection that the sciences are hopelessly positivistic and concerned only with observable, quantifiable phenomenon . . . However, methodologies for drawing rigorous inferences concerning unobservable phenomena have a long tradition in science; nuclear physics and radio astronomy are obvious examples of disciplines founded on such techniques. Cognitive psychology in particular has developed methods for making inferences concerning how the mind works. Although mental operations such as problem solving, memory retrieval and language comprehension cannot be observed directly, one can gain knowledge of them by synthesizing a variety of observable signs such as verbal reports, response latencies, and degrees of accuracy in the performance of specific tasks. Understanding what this network of evidence says about the object of study is guided by a history of logic, theory, and methodological development.
Though the authors end with a nod to theory, the fundamental theoretical question of reference remains: to the charge that an empirical method is not appropriate to the unobservable character of aesthetic response, Bortolussi and Dixon counter that their study will be based on ''a variety of observable signs.'' In other words, though we cannot observe the workings of the mind, our understanding must still rely on observation. Our point is that there is no reflection on the nature of observation, reference, or empirical method here. This is not to say that the synthesis of the variety of observable signs cannot yield interesting scholarship, but only that its claim to accurately describe aesthetic experience is no more valid than that of more speculative, antifoundational criticism. The jump from ''real readers'' to conclusions about ''literary response'' is just as large in empirically grounded scholarship as it is in theoretically informed criticism.
Without discounting the potential merits of the programs here advocated, it is nonetheless clear that such prescriptive methods for the study of film and literary narrative seek not to resolve the problems forwarded by theory but to dissolve them. Vexing questions of referentiality are to be pragmatically ignored. 6 In part, this move relies on distinguishing between two senses of ''theory''-claiming to valorize, on the one hand, a notion of theory as the progressive accumulation of disciplinary knowledge claims 6. Andrew confirms the success of this trajectory by surveying the evolving programs of the Society for Cinema Studies annual conferences. By the mid-seventies, half of the papers presented at this convention-nine of nineteen, with no concurrent sessions-were devoted to theoretical questions primarily. The ''turn to history'' in the 1980s ''encourage[d] a proliferation of topics'' in history and cultural studies; by 1998, ''nearly half the over four hundred papers (read from morning to night in nine rooms) treated the politics of representing ethnicity, gender, and sexuality. By contrast, only ten percent of panels addressed film theory'' (Andrew 2000: 347, 348) . and practices (e.g., a methodology based on establishing and testing hypotheses) while, on the other hand, disclaiming and devaluing a notion of theory as an ongoing speculative enterprise, marked by correction and revision, and devoted to those features of experience, aesthetic and otherwise, not susceptible to scientific isolation and analysis. Certainly, the former definition of theory-as a pragmatic guide to producing scholarship-has its value. However, there is no sense in which the latter definition of theory can be said to have vitiated its viability, let alone its appeal. For example, in the passages from Bortolussi and Dixon and Bordwell and Carroll, the celebration of a new dispensation for a humble and vibrant humanistic practice depends upon a number of rhetorical tropes posing as knowledge claims, seeking a transparency that we ought to question.
The risk of this turn to empirical research and material history is twofold. First, it is difficult to conceive of the historical data culled by Bordwell and Carroll's ''imaginative historians and rigorous theorists'' offering up its significance autonomously. How rigorous, one might ask, is a theorist who is ''willing to ignore'' anything? It is one thing to engage and dispute, another to dismiss and ignore. Wittgenstein's direct engagement with positivism, first as its champion and then, upon reflection, as its executioner, ought to serve as a warning to those eager to ignore questions of method. According to Bordwell and Carroll, certain critics, lacking imagination, focus, rigor, and deep learning, nearly closed off the forward progress of knowledge through their persecution of other scholars happily possessed of such traits and skills.Whether this account accurately describes recent intellectual history is certainly debatable. Sander Gilman has argued quite the opposite: ''I think one must be careful in assuming that intellectuals have some kind of insight. In fact, if the track record of intellectuals is any indication, not only have intellectuals been wrong almost all the time, but they have been wrong in corrosive and destructive ways'' (Eakin 2003) . What is less debatable is that whatever facts are being advanced in this account, the form of their presentation-indeed, the form upon which they depend for any coherence at all-is a narrative of righteous insurgence and a nearteleology of progress.
This leads to the second problem. The interpretive methods that guide scholarship-whether those of Grand Theory or those of empirical scholarship-often produce the insights putatively found in the objects studied. Stanley Fish makes exactly these points in an essay skewering the recent popularity of biographies in North America, a trend easily correlated with the rise of historicism in the humanities. Fish (1999) writes, ''In an age . . . when master narratives have little or no credibility meaning is supposed to just well up spontaneously from the details.'' Master narratives here, of course, refer to the grand theories of emancipation (first divine providence and Enlightenment science and later Marxism and psychoanalysis) that Lyotard put to rest in The Postmodern Condition (1984) , with their pretense to explain and contain experience and interpretation. It also refers, however, to the narrative paradigms that biographers actually employ, such as providence or fortune, while not acknowledging the arbitrary relation of these formal schemes to the data of a life to be told. Since ''details unattached to a master story don't mean anything in particular, or can mean anything at all,'' what links up the details is a ''spiral sprawl of speculation'' (Fish 1999) . In this light-if we acknowledge the formative relationship between critical writing and critical meaning-David Kastan's (1999: 31) call for critics to begin ''not by producing more theory, but more facts'' is less a call for original thought and more an announcement that the empirical approach has won the day.
Before we admit that theory is dead and gone for good (in all senses), it is worthwhile to consider seriously whether or not something is lost, or lost for the wrong reasons, when its project wanes. Writing again from the perspective of film studies, Andrew (2000: 345-46) suggests the demise of theory as a ruling paradigm may be something less to celebrate than to question: Exuberant in its adolescent ambitions for a unified field of cinema studies, structuralist theory was promulgated by a self-assured cadre-pretentious or heroic, as you choose-whose project would be prematurely abandoned, perhaps because of internal contradictions, but more certainly because its logic was at odds with that of the university system. From this perspective, the attraction of historical and material approaches to film studies-and this would be true across a wide range of fields in the humanities-rests in large part on the possibility of efficient production of such case studies, on the ease of differentiating between them by criteria of novelty and didactic claims, and on their ready quantifiability for assessment at educational institutions that increasingly function on the business model. The atrocious job market in the humanities in the 1980s and 1990s, in other words, may have contributed to the historical turn in much the same way, perhaps, as the surfeit of academic jobs in the late 1960s and early 1970s encouraged and rewarded the speculative experiments of that era. Andrew Delbanco tells precisely this story in his grim assessment of the state of literary studies in the American academy, ''The Decline and Fall of Literature'' (1999) . Another problem, suggested by the persistent interest of humanists in science and scientific methods, is that literary and cultural theorists have not established an alternative methodology that might legitimate their study alongside the hard and social sciences. 7 The ''new materialism'' is not simply the product of a neoconservative desire to return to the safety of hard facts. Perhaps the most telling sign that the material turn is indeed here is the appearance in autumn 2001 of a special issue of the journal Critical Inquiry on ''Things.'' This is telling because Critical Inquiry has long been considered a leading theory journal published in the United States. As is to be expected of a journal of Critical Inquiry's quality, the essays included are fabulously rich, and they cover a wide range of ''things,'' from gloves to fossils to pebbles to flapper dresses. Perhaps equally unsurprising is the fact that the essays are anything but empirical studies-they are steeped in theory of the more speculative variety. Relevant to our interest in thing and theory here is Bill Brown's (2001: 3) announcement in the introduction that the issue on things is essentially an attempt to suggest possible directions for a ''thing theory'':
Can't we learn from this materialism instead of taking the trouble to trouble it? Can't we remain content with the ''real, very dirty window''-a ''thing''-as the answer to what ails us without turning it into an ailment of its own? Fat Chance.
While we agree with Brown (ibid.) (and the other contributors to ''Things'') that ''even the most coarse and commonsensical things, perpetually pose a problem because of the specific unspecificity that 'things' denotes . . . [that] taking the side of things hardly puts a stop to that thing called theory,'' many less-speculative critics would like to do just that. Moreover, in rejecting the possibility that any interest in things might ''put a stop to'' theory, Brown betrays his true investment in ''thing theory''-for example, that things offer a new thing about which one might theorize. It is here that we part ways with the interests of the Critical Inquiry issue, as our aim is not to claim the material turn for a more or less unaltered theoretical practice ( just as we will not go along willingly where the material turn might lead). The idea that making a theory of things will amount to ''turning [the answer to our ailment] into an ailment of its own'' is precisely what high theory has always been accused of doing (sacrificing meaning to ''radical relativism,'' the organic or coherent text to ''the incoherencies of relativism and antifoundationalism''); the fact that Brown willingly embraces this eventuality 7. The Sokal hoax is a clear example of this but one that also points to the lack of a theoretical ground for humanistic study that is not derived from the scientific method (e.g., the hoax was so embarrassing because the parody was invalid by scientific standards). Harry Boyte (2000: 48-49) argues that all university study in the United States is guided by a scientific positivism codified in the first half of the twentieth century and largely unquestioned since. amounts to him showing his hand. In turn, the essays in ''Things,'' fabulous and searching, eclectic and properly essayistic, do not ground their inquiry in things but, rather, consider the concept of things-and specific examples that can be seen to represent the concept-in theoretical terms. Put another way, the essays would not go very far toward comforting those frustrated by the linguistic acrobatics (or simple opacity) of French-influenced AngloAmerican poststructuralism.
Consider, for example, the following passage from John Frow's (2001: 272) essay ''A Pebble, a Camera, a Man Who Turns into a Telegraph Pole'':
Thingness is the tautologous identity of subject and predicate. If we are to understand its entelechy, the perfection of its necessary being, we must suppose it to have an intention regarding meaning which is exactly and entirely coextensive with it, to have a scent which can be defined only as the negation of all the properties of scent, to have equal and opposite emotion which entirely befit its status as an emotionless entity.
This is not what the fact-seekers want. Which is not a criticism of the essay but an observation that it does not represent a different orientation to knowledge grounded in an attention to materiality, except perhaps in Paul de Man's sense of the ''material event'' (see Cohen 2001) .
A more explicit attempt to merge theory with a more properly material, empirical method can be found in Kastan's work. In Shakespeare after Theory, Kastan (1999: 31-32) does not seek to dismiss theory; rather, he seeks to incorporate its values into a historicism made all the more confident by its having learned the lessons of theory once and for all:
The great age of theory is over . . . but not because theory has been discredited; on the contrary, it is precisely because its claims have proven so compelling and productive . . . . If theory has convincingly demonstrated that meaning is not immanent but rather situational, or, put differently, that both reading and writing are not unmediated activities but take place only and always in context and action, the specific situations, contexts and actions-that is, the actual historical circumstances of literary production and reception-cannot be merely gestured at but must be recovered and analyzed.
Bordwell and Carroll's praise for those who ignored charges of empiricism and positivism is an unnecessary move for Kastan (ibid.: 18) , who finds in material culture an anchor for the interpretive process of cultural criticism:
A sharper focus on the material relations of discourse to the world in which it circulates would give its cultural analysis more historical purchase, fixing it more firmly in relation to the actual producers and consumers of those discourses, locating it, that is, in the world of lived history.
If the focused research program advocated in Post-Theory offers a little history and turns us away from speculative theory as excessive formalism, Kastan thus offers a lot of history, which returns us to precisely those questions of form and theory he assures us are well settled. But what rhetorical work is being performed by such terms as material, actual, and lived history? As benchmarks of interpretive accuracy, are they somehow more transparently accessible than, say, the aesthetic works which they surround and explain? If the turn from theory has gone so far as to focus on the thing, it becomes imperative to ask the straight theoretical question of precisely what the thing is. Of course, this is the question that animates the contributors to Brown's special issue, and though our interest in the question is parallel, we begin with a strong sense that the question is unanswerable.
The ''thing itself '' is among the most seductive and elusive notions in the history of Western metaphysics. This concept posits that inanimate matter possesses an a priori autonomy at the same time that it exposes the interrelated processes of interpretation and perception required to recognize the object as distinct-in itself, apart from any observing consciousness. Despite the concept's tautological defense of commonsense perception, a belief in the autonomy of things persists. What, then, is a thing? The question inevitably returns the questioner to the fraught conception of a material entity free from subjective contamination. But, of course, as indicated above, this is a tautological formulation that one must accept on faith.The cycle might be repeated endlessly, were it not for the possibility of isolating certain characteristics of things: these do not emanate from thingsin-themselves without the mediating intervention of human consciousness but are nonetheless consistently agreed upon by even the most abstract relativists. While arguing for the usefulness of theory in a ''post-theory'' age, Martin McQuillan, Graeme Macdonald, Robin Purves, and Stephen Thomson are nonetheless willing to admit that ''theorists also have mortgages' ' (McQuillan et al. 1999: xi) . In the heuristic juxtaposition that serves as the title of this special issue, ''thing'' holds the position of the mortgage, of the unassailable fact. In questioning historical work centered on the thing, then, we are not denying the need for a responsibility to things. However, just as theories can become unreflective methodological programs in which readings are produced ''according to plan,'' the facticity of things can be mistaken for a variety of truths. As our real interest is in the space between thing and theory, we urge an examination of the process by which the ontological status of the thing is assumed to provide a basis for epistemological inquiry. To return to the question: a thing is that which is granted the status of a fact by virtue of its material existence, which (it is assumed) can be verified by the senses. There is no question that such facts exist and that the opportunities they afford to cultural criticism are great. The difficulty lies in the concomitant tendency of things to become objects (of study, of desire, etc.) before our very eyes. Thus the instant that the thing is reduced to a set of characteristics on which we might agree, it is taken up and transformed into something much less settled: evidence, symbol, artifact.
If, in the course of these essays, the nature of the thing seems to shift, this is a result of the multiform ways in which things become objects, for no account based on things leaves things in their imputed autonomous state. When Kastan claims that we need ''more facts,'' it is safe to say that he is not suggesting that there is nothing in the archive, that all the evidence has been destroyed or lost. Rather, he is implying that we will not know the whole of a text's history, or even very much of it, unless we determine the facts of that history by examining the material things through which we have gained our knowledge of it. But the necessity of such determinations reminds us that facts are not necessarily things. It is often considered a fact that we have no autograph manuscript of a play by Shakespeare, for example, but this fact is based on nothing rather than on some thing. To take an alternate example, a thing such as the Shroud of Turin becomes an object confirming a variety of conflicting facts. This is to say that not all facts are based on things and not all things represent singular facts. More facts actually means more determinations of fact on the part of engaged interpreters, which in turn raises questions of method. The validity of a fact-that which makes it a fact, that it is ''true,'' ''really the case,'' and so forth-does not reside in some autonomous material base (the world of ''things themselves'' with which we have no truck), but in the consensus granted by the community of interpreters. When Margreta de Grazia, Maureen Quilligan, and Peter Stallybrass (1996: 5) insist that ''the object be taken into account'' in order that ''new relations between subject (as position, as person) and object (as position, as thing) may emerge and familiar relations change,'' they are not arguing that we attend to a new archive that has been overlooked, ignored, or lost. Theirs is, rather, a question of method: they hope that critics will examine the ways in which objects orient and define subjects as well as practice the more traditional approach of understanding the attitudes of subjects through their desire for or denial of objects. The invocation of thing in these accounts draws out the rhetorical power of the fact as the materially grounded, static, and neutral site of the historical record. But the notion that things (unlike objects) can serve as a neutral, static ground-even with the recognition that interpreters of things are radically variable-is itself a trope, a rhetorical move.
As we see it, our argument relates to the variety of new material and empirical approaches in that it attempts to forge a kind of middle way between the two trends outlined above. On the one hand, we see a new enthusiasm for the material record, for ''data'' and ''facts'' as the basis for any inquiry and as an attempt to establish a scientific base for cultural study, while, on the other hand, we identify a kind of theoretical prioritizing of materiality-for example, ''things'' in the sense addressed by the Critical Inquiry special issue or in the ability of a detail to become ''luminous'' when described by Catherine Gallagher and Stephen Greenblatt (2000) . Both groups downplay the self-critically theoretical, insofar as it is associated with the ''big theory'' or ''pure theory'' of the 1970s and early 1980s, in favor of a more-grounded (and less-speculative) critical practice. On the one hand, there is an overly hasty turn toward the ''really'' historical (''really'' because it is verifiable). On the other hand, there is an increasing detachment from the traditional subjects of critical scrutiny (e.g., artworks) in favor of a turn to things (e.g., pencils, cigarettes, etc.) as a privileged, even fetishized, category for figural analysis. It is our position that the former trend reproduces some of the problematic conclusions of historical criticism prior to the intervention of high theory, as in the ''old historicism's'' tendency to claim an ability to identify the cultural identity of historical moments. We note that those in this historically or empirically oriented group tend to argue that the turn to things is not happening at the same time that they demand that any critique of their practice be backed up with ''facts'' (a tautological position, in our view). 8 The latter trend, by contrast, claims that we are in a moment that is ''past theory,'' that we must now turn to a theoretical criticism, in which materiality is subsumed under a prior or established theoretical practice.
In short, it is between thing and theory that a salve for the excesses of both empirical zeal and theoretical abstraction can be found.When the power of the material base as a ground for interpretive practice is revealed to be itself an abstraction, the discussion of the authority of competing critical discourses turns back (as above) to questions of method. For only if agreement on methodological validity can be reached will currents such as the turn toward or away from material (empirical) studies gain momentum. Thus the state of criticism is always itself a historical matter, as the proponents of emergent methodological paradigms respond to their predecessors at least as directly as they do to the things that capture their imaginations and guide their work. 9 It is wrong to think that the cultural artifacts that constitute the 8. Bortolussi and Dixon (2003: 22) assert, for example, that ''although there is no denying the importance of reflecting on one's scholarly activities, theoretical disquisitions on the proper uses of empiricism cannot replace sound empirical investigation, and the benefits of reflection are quickly exhausted if not accompanied by practice.'' 9. Stanley Fish (1995: 128-29 ) makes a similar point in arguing that no particular brand of criticism can be ''more historical'' than another. material base might suggest a corrective to theoretical abstraction when the critical work that exhumes them is itself fully situated within the domain of an ongoing process of critical displacement, a process which is bolstered by (but not constituted in) heuristic oppositions like that between the material (thing) and the abstract (theory).
In the context of Anglo-American literary criticism, the emergence of the new historicism and its coincident displacement of the various versions of ''Grand Theory'' is an instructive example of the kind of critical displacement that is sometimes confused with critical evolution. This is not the place for outlining a precise genealogy of the emergence, success, and potential transformation of New Historicism. 10 However, certain moments in the career of this school of criticism reveal what we take to be a more general drift from a humanistic scene dominated by a problematic centrality of theory to a more contemporary scene dominated by an equally problematic centrality of the thing.
The ''Grand Theory'' of the Yale school of deconstructionists in the 1970s and 1980s could be emblematic here of the former dispensation. The rigorous methodological self-consciousness of such theorists as Derrida, J. Hillis Miller, Geoffrey Hartman, and de Man resulted both in highly nuanced accounts of interpretation and in widespread concern that such reflexivity effectively denied critical attention to the realities of social, historical, and political contexts. Although a controversy whose complexity cannot be rehearsed adequately here, the downfall of the reputation of Paul de Man could be seen to concretize this dilemma. 11 Perhaps the most influential teacher of deconstruction as well as its purest practitioner, in that his works are replete with prescriptions against alternative interpretive strategies, de Man's ambiguous politics drew international attention when revelations of his wartime journalism demonstrated a sympathetic relation to the Nazi occupiers of his native Belgium. In this context, history-the realm of material concerns, social institutions, political events, and things themselves-seemed to urgently require attention that, in some quarters at least, had been denied it.
The political emphasis of New Historicism and its apparent break with the hermeticism of poststructuralism increased its prestige just as poststructuralism's faded. Michael Warner, a scholar of American literary history, traces this turn of events and its aftermath in this manner: ''The same theoretical arguments that have been associated with poststructuralism and deconstruction have also led to what is known as the New Historicism, 10. For accounts of the trajectory of New Historicism, see Pechter 1986 , Howard 1987 , and especially Dionne 1992 . 11. See Harpham 1995 for another version of de Man's exemplary fall. and thus to a strong interest in the history of the book'' (quoted in Thomas 1991: 6) . This narrative of succession is one of happy inheritance, with the strengths (one presumes not the weaknesses) of the earlier theory and method passed on to new generations of scholars who will one day bestow this patrimony on their own followers. However, the actual generational relationships are not necessarily as seamless as Warner's tone suggests. Gallagher and Greenblatt announce in their recent Practicing New Historicism (2000: 2) that, in their recollection, '' 'new historicism' at first signified an impatience with American New Criticism, an unsettling of established norms and procedures.'' Certainly, any American scholar of their generation would have been trained in New Criticism. However, an important moment in the institutionalization of poststructuralism was the publication of de Man's Blindness and Insight (1971) , with its critique of the New Criticism. If New Historicism was to establish itself as a critical paradigm, it would not be in distinction from the ''little formalism'' of the New Criticism but from the more extreme formalism of what has been called the age of theory, marked by its deep skepticism toward referentiality. When Greenblatt (1980: 4-5) published the founding document of New Historicism in Renaissance studies-Renaissance Self-Fashioning-he tried to name his practice ''a poetics of culture.'' And though, as Sonja Laden's discussion in Part II (to appear in the next issue) attests, this is probably a more accurate term for his critical practice, the critical climate was ripe for the idea of a new kind of history, one that absorbed the teachings of Foucault, Lacan, and Louis Althusser on the impossibility of objectivity and Clifford Geertz on the representational character of all cultural study-even (as in Geertz's case) of anthropology. Describing the emergence of the New Historicism twenty years after the fact, Greenblatt notes the influence of Geertz above all else and attributes the theoretical innovation of (at least his part in) the movement to a desire to have a ''touch of the real'' (Gallagher and Greenblatt 2000: 20-48) . Despite Warner's positioning of the French-influenced American poststructuralism as New Historicism's graceful mentor, American poststructuralists perceived the emerging turn toward history as anything but natural or altogether welcome.
J. Hillis Miller's (1987: 283) Presidential Address at the MLA convention in 1986 is a strikingly pointed defense of the project of ''theory'' in the face of a growing resistance characterized by an impatient ''shift from language to history.'' By theory Miller (ibid.) means here ''the displacement in literary studies from a focus on the meaning of a text to a focus on the way meaning is conveyed . . . a focus on referentiality as a problem.'' More specifically still, he means ''a rhetorical study of literature . . . the multiform movement called 'deconstruction ' '' (ibid.: 290) . From a pinnacle of the profession, Miller (ibid.: 284) surveys a time and place when the project of theory encountered resistance from the left, who object that ''it is immoral not to be concerned with history, with society, with the real conditions.'' Meanwhile, ''from the right come cries that it is immoral to shift from a thematic concern with literature . . . to a nihilistic and 'radically skeptical' concern with language'' (ibid.). Both sides agree that ''it is immoral to get lost in the sterile meanderings of language playing with itself '' (ibid.). According to Miller, the need felt by theory's opponents ''to point the finger of blame against theory to avoid thinking through the challenges theory poses to their own ideologies'' amounts to ''a blind refusal to read'' (ibid.). For Miller, speaking just after theory's high-water mark, no method or object of study can ever resolve the multiplicity and complexity of symbolic representation and interpretation which constitutes for him (somewhat paradoxically) the baseline ''fact.'' Therefore, if the notion of a material base or ground to rest certain analysis upon is, according to Miller (ibid.: 289) , thoroughly idealistic, then ''the concept of the material is . . . not a solution [to interpretive uncertainty] but a problem'' in itself. This is the case-as David Ayers also argues in his essay on materialism in this issue-because ''theory, even a theory of the material base, is precisely a clear seeing that turns the material base, this particular piece of paper here and now, into a generalized and generalizable abstraction'' (Miller 1987: 289 ).
Miller's immersion in what Rorty has called the ''linguistic turn'' in twentieth-century thought is manifest throughout his defense of theory at this early moment of crisis. Interestingly for our purposes, he turns his defense directly upon an emerging critical school whose influence continues to this day: ''Nothing that is said about the end of theory, for example by advocates and practitioners of the so-called new historicism who claim that they have gone beyond theory and back to solid, atheoretical historical research, can obscure'' their own theoretical nature; ''such claims to be atheoretical end by being obviously theoretical statements'' (Miller 1987: 286) . Rather than turning toward materiality or thing as a corrective to the vagaries of interpretation, Miller pins the hopes of criticism's future on deconstruction, as coming closest to at least describing the conundrums of reading and their reasons for being-in particular the ways in which texts and language provide catachrestic tropes of a material reality whose seductive charms are perhaps, as Helen Freshwater suggests later in this issue, ultimately illusory.
Miller's attempt to contain the resistance to poststructuralist theory was not to succeed, as the primacy of the historical turn was already well established. In fact, poststructuralism's impending decline was acknowledged in the very next essay in the same issue of PMLA by Edward Pechter (1987: 292) , who begins portentously (''A specter is haunting criticism-the specter of new historicism'') and ends with a resigned decision to join in: ''Putting the text back into history . . . is clearly a valuable project. Maybe it is the only project. In any case it is far too important to be left to the new historicists' ' (ibid.: 302) . From the present perspective, after roughly twenty years of New Historicist scholarship, however, critical priorities have so changed that New Historicism is now characterized not as the triumph of history but as the problematic persistence of theory. While Warner suggests that a rising contemporary materialist practice, the field of book history, descends gracefully and gratefully from New Historicism, which descended likewise from poststructuralism, Kastan tactfully but explicitly articulates the strong and somewhat agonistic distinctions between these generations of critical practices. For him (1999: 30), New Historicist procedures ''are not properly historical at all but rather formalist practices,'' an analysis that Sonja Laden will take up with more exuberant appreciation in Part II of this special issue. Insofar as New Historicism on principle requires critics ''to acknowledge their situatedness . . . as it determines the questions that are asked of the past,'' the resulting ''theoretical sophistication'' of these works tends to occlude the actual past in its distinctiveness. Instead, seemingly hung up on the demands that theoretical self-awareness makes upon their methods of analysis and exposition, New Historians reveal themselves as overly theoretical. In contrast, Kastan (ibid.: 19) calls for a criticism which calls less attention to its own formal complexity (he refers to it as ''the New Boredom'') and is ''more rigorously historical than recent theory-driven studies have been'' (ibid.: 31). Happily, he announces the palpable signs of the delivery on this hope: ''The great age of theory is over (and evidence, if it is needed, might be gathered from the MLA job listings from which 'theory' jobs, after a proliferation in the early 1980s, have now virtually disappeared)'' (ibid.). If Miller's rearguard defense of theory failed, the same might be prophesized for defenses of New Historicism. In a provocative keynote address at a recent conference on Material Cultures at Edinburgh, Greenblatt presented a diverse audience with a direct challenge entitled ''Resisting Materialism.'' In this talk, he developed an anecdote, that signature figure of New Historical rhetoric or poetics, regarding his efforts to gain access to an illuminated manuscript known as the ''Huth Hours,'' housed in the British Library. Despite the ultimate success of his endeavor to see this singular object, with important details of the representation of skin tone that no reproduction could, as yet, convey, Greenblatt indicated that ultimately the material object delivered less a satisfaction of the desire for knowledge than a reminder that the discourse dependent upon perceptions and mispercep-tions of objects routinely outstrips the interest value of the things themselves. Material history thus does not offer truths that resolve interpretive problems, as whatever meaning material objects have is perpetually subject to interested and subjective comprehensions of them. It is as if Greenblatt has moved from the position of the perceived insurgent to the position of the established center. 12 There, like Miller before, he offers a ringing warning about a rising and barbarous paradigm. Rather than accepting this Oedipal narrative of generational succession as the natural way of things, which implies a certain deafness to past protest and a complacency with the contemporary situation, we contend that the reservations of critics and theorists under challenge ought not be ignored. Least of all when they can be read as guiding us away from the procrustean either/or game of thing and theory.
How, then, might we navigate between thing and theory? In an account of the advances and setbacks in twentieth-century literary studies, Lies Wesseling (1996: 302) has commented that ''the study of literature has undergone an empirical turn through [a] change of emphasis from stylistic analysis and interpretation towards sociologically and psychologically informed inquiries into literary group behavior. A strict separation of the object-and meta-level of inquiry rather than a universally valid definition of literature serves to bolster up claims to scientific prestige nowadays.'' Though a straightforward return to theory is clearly untenable in this context, Miller's recognition of the potential shortcomings of a historical turn in criticism still resonates. Writing an account of deconstruction in an overview of critical schools and methods in 1992, ''after the historical turn has come to call,'' Deborah Esch (1992: 387-88) foresaw a moment when the progress of historicism or materialism may benefit from a return of attention to the complex demands of particular acts of interpretation, precisely the space between thing and theory that this collection seeks to explore: ''To the extent that an overly impatient 'return to history' . . . forgets the irreducible textuality of history and histories-it risks positing nonreading in a systematic way. When the avoidance of reading becomes systematic, hegemonic, then reading in the sense posited by deconstruction, however circumscribed its apparent scope, becomes a counterhegemonic undertaking.'' If New Historicism was susceptible to charges of nonreading, its successor, with its new emphasis on empirical verifiability, and without proper reflection, may lead to an even more pervasive and systematic nonreading. 13 For the turn to things and its concomitant empiricism places the prac-12. A telling pointer to the transition can be found in Frank Kermode's (2001) decision to review Kastan's Shakespeare after Theory in the same space as Gallagher and Greenblatt's Practicing New Historicism. 13. In Renaissance studies, Douglas Bruster (2001: 237) notes that ''the new materialism's tice of reading-interpreting and reflecting on the process of interpretation-in a position below that of evidentiary discovery. In this sense, despite the abundant caveats to the contrary, the return of the archive is a return to a Rankean model of historiography, which has its origins in Leopold von Ranke's ''exposure of the limitation of narrative sources'' when compared to ''official records, emanating from governments and preserved in archives'' (Burke 1992: 4) . The return marks the latest swing of the pendulum between the extremes of thing and theory, traced in our critical genealogy of recent Anglo-American critical practice. The concern of this special issue is with slowing the movement of the pendulum, halting it in the space between what Miller termed the ''sterile meanderings of language playing with itself '' (the now familiar caricature of ''high'' theory) and the equally unsatisfying mode of Kastan's ''New Boredom'' (in which interpretation becomes secondary to the search for a ground in material things). 14 Missing at both poles of our heuristic dichotomy is something like noninstrumental reflection: pausing over difficulties, lingering at the point of judgment, resisting categorical but not evaluative judgments, revising, combining, and second-guessing choices. The kind of reflection we are suggesting is not the reflexive practice of high theory. The lack of the alternate spelling of ''reflection'' as ''reflexion'' in standard American usage helps clarify the distinction we are trying to make here. When the more speculative forms of theory become abstract games attendant on their objects of study only to reveal contradiction, semantic slippage, or political coercion, they become detached from what is perhaps the most challenging and exhilarating aspect of self-critical theory's project, namely, the continuous examination of method, the grounds from which methods spring, and the ends toward which methods lead. All of these concerns are rendered available for critical reflection only insofar as they are enabled to emerge by means of open-ended attentiveness to the object of critical scrutinyhere understood as the traces of another subjectivity's interests and aspirations. Failing such open attentiveness, theoretical reflexion risks exploiting the aesthetic object for nearly autonomous performances of rhetorical sophistication. This is not to say that such theoretical practices lack reflexivity. On the contrary, the reflexive move often becomes the source of the detachment, to emphasis on 'hard facts' of concrete objects and the role of the physical in shaping the culture of the time . . . can also be faulted for promoting a vulgar materialism divorced from some of the complex and nuanced analytical traditions of nineteenth-and twentieth-century materialism.'' 14. The lack of a payoff in Kastan's book is the primary criticism levied by Frank Kermode (2001) in his review in the New York Review of Books. the extent that the performance of critical play removes the critic from any authentically transactional relationship with his or her object of inquiry. The viability of any such engagement is and ought to be difficult to gage; but its allure should be obvious, and the expectations for its realization manifest, in the transformations of procedure evident in the essaying of criticism. Rainer Maria Rilke provides an example here in an ekphrastic poem that epitomizes our desire for criticism. The subject of his poem ''Archaic Torso of Apollo'' would ''seem defaced . . . would not . . . burst like a star'' if not for the fact that we ''cannot know his legendary head.'' This lack of certainty itself produces pleasures that ''dazzle'' viewers, who experience both epistemic uncertainty and a realization in the aesthetic encounter that ''here there is no place / that does not see you. You must change your life'' (Rilke 1995: 67) .
Similarly, to accept the material turn tout court is to naturalize the process by which things become objects as a result of their apprehension by conscious observers. 15 To eschew the transactional nature of our relationship to things, by granting them an autonomous existence, is to gain apparent certainty at the cost of the generative uncertainty that Rilke celebrates. For him, the experience with the statue cannot be reduced to the knowledge of any of its material components or, broken as it is, to any imagined whole. Rather, meaning emerges in the dialectical play between subject and object, each transforming the other. In contrast to Rilke's meditation on incompletion, we find, at both poles of our heuristic dichotomy, an unwillingness to linger in the between, in the middle space between objective certainty and radical relativism, so that method is reduced to an instrumental exercise. 16 In suggesting an alternative to choosing between either extreme of thing and theory we hope to refocus attention on the potential of criticism to occupy this space between, what Emmanuel Levinas (1989: 141) has called ''the meanwhile,'' to facilitate productive contemplation in the face of the inconclusiveness of aesthetic experience. Though much humanistic study is directly engaged with the unsettled questions that concern the liminal, the marginal, the transitional, the desire to counter uncertainty with either the 15. See Brown's ''Thing Theory'' for a discussion of the problematic process. In a footnote, Brown (2001: 4) suggests that we must follow Vladimir Nabokov's notion of a ''dialectic of looking through and looking at.'' Despite the sense that looking at might produce a heightened attention to our relation to things, Brown (ibid.) admits that ''by looking at things we render them objects.'' For a discussion of the idea of looking through and at, see the essay by Knapp in the present issue. 16. In Contingencies of Value (1988) , Barbara Herrnstein Smith provides one compelling model for a critical practice that might free itself from these two tendencies. By suggesting a radical contingency for value judgments, Smith asserts that one can have truths while simultaneously debunking the notion of universality. coherent language of theory or the presumed solidity of the material base persists. What is lost when we move too far in either direction are the challenges and possibilities inherent in an engagement with richly provocative but ultimately unmasterable objects.
The essays collected here (Part I: 24, no. 4; Part II: 25, no.1) address the agonistic relationship of theory and thing by examining interpretive situations in which an appeal to either pole reveals the need for a careful attention to both. Part I, ''The Nature of the Thing,'' addresses how theory and method penetrate the objects-books, cups, lockets, and so forth-that are often taken for things, the voiceless material base, which is thought to comprise the archive. The first two essays, by Douglas Brooks and James Knappwhich could be placed under the rubric ''Putting Things in Their Place''-examine assumptions about the material artifacts that ground historical scholarship. Brooks reflects on the recent surge in the field of ''Book History'' and its attendant emphasis on the ''materiality of the text,'' which has produced a growing body of scholarship aimed at examining the physical characteristics of the material vehicles that serve as containers for texts. This field is marked by a sharp distinction between the book-considered a distinct, unique object-and the text, which, in Adrian Johns's (1998: xxi) description, ''is the content of any written or printed work, considered apart from its particular material manifestation.'' The most important implication of this renewed attention to the old distinction between form and content is an emphasis on the ideality of the notion of the text. 17 Texts free from materiality are idealized projections, usually of those hoping to confirm the singularity of an author's achievement. A textual scholar himself, Brooks recognizes the advances made by the new emphasis on what Jerome McGann (1991: 13) has called ''bibliographic codes,'' the nonlinguistic aspects of the material text that nonetheless affect meaning. However, this renewed focus cannot obviate the conditional nature of our experience with the material text. For, as Brooks argues, if language is the container of understanding, then even the seemingly objective qualities of books are shaped by the language in which they are made to mean. Identifying the gains made by book historians against earlier forms of authorial intention and taking the special case of Shakespeare and so-called ''bardolatry,'' Brooks cautions that the current enthusiasm over the materiality of the text needs to be tempered by the acknowledgment that no material aspect of the text can make meaning independent of an observing (and thus alter-ing) consciousness. Hans-Georg Gadamer's hermeneutics serves as a model for Brooks's interpretive practice, which includes extratextual material evidence available through the study of print history but which is itself open to the continual process of reinterpretation.
Focusing on the process by which visual experience is naturalized as objective perception, Knapp offers a reading of Othello as an allegory of the perils of critical methods that accept the narratives created for objects as the things themselves. Without denying the basis of all interpretive practice in material forms, Knapp works out a middle way between the things on which we base our understanding of the world and the power of our understanding to transform things into facts. Returning to the late phase of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's ontology of perception, Knapp suggests that the object-facts that ground material, archive-driven studies derive their ontological solidity from their power over the individuals who act on their ''truth,'' that is, after the fact. The handkerchief that condemns Desdemona proves nothing in itself, but the actions of those convinced by its neutrality as an inanimate object transform and solidify its centrality in the tragedy. In the causal logic of the play, ''seeing is believing,'' but only after a belief has been firmly established in a character's mind. Indeed, in the course of the tragedy, believing is seeing. If the truth of things is only available after the fact, Knapp asserts, then our responsibility to the artifacts contained in the archive is most important at the moment we transform our experience with material things through understanding.Whereas the advocates of material textual studies have convincingly demonstrated the need to attend to the objects through which our experience of the cultural past has been and will be mediated, we must, Knapp stresses, continue to pay attention to the particular ways in which our reading of these material artifacts is circumscribed by methodological assumptions and the legacy of traditional hermeneutics.
In the next two articles, which could be grouped under the title ''Proving Grounds,'' Helen Freshwater and David Ayers examine how the tendency to grant priority to the category of materiality can be linked to a seductive but faulty confusion of objects (laden with meaning) with things (a valid but inaccessible idealism). Where Brooks explores the book, Freshwater examines the larger textual container, the archive, asking similar questions, though arriving at somewhat different conclusions. She notes that, as we mine the archive for historical knowledge, we often overlook the tendency of archives to reflect the ideological, political, and aesthetic concerns of those who created them. Perhaps more important than this observation, however, is Freshwater's claim that we overlook these concerns because of our liability to become subject to the haunting voices we reanimate in the process of archival reconstruction. The Lord Chamberlain's Plays and Correspondence archive (covering the first seventy years of twentieth-century theatrical censorship in Britain) serves as Freshwater's primary example. It was there that she began to recognize the peculiar relationship she formed with the dead records of history. Drawing on Derrida's exploration of the fetishization of the archive, but mindful of the immense potential of the Lord Chamberlain's Plays and Correspondence archive, Freshwater proposes a cautious indulgence in the pleasures of archival immersion. Her awareness of the power of the archive to draw one into the position of the voyeur, a position that is closely associated with that of aesthetic reflection, is, she suggests, a function of archival study that must be acknowledged and incorporated into the critical accounts born of the encounter. Her call, then, is not to abandon the archive, but to reconfigure our understanding of its place in the world of interpretive experience. Rather than presenting us with an array of things, clues to the life-world in which they were produced and since preserved, Freshwater's archive contains the voices of others with whom we must negotiate an understanding of ourselves. Her desire for evidence of resistance in the face of state-sponsored censorship ought to register as a determining prejudice, an interest in reading ''against the grain,'' which is not suggested by the documents contained in the archive, but by Freshwater's own resistance to its claim of objectivity. The loss detected in the censorship records is complete: we can never recover theatrical performances that were disallowed.The trace of that loss can serve critical inquiry only insofar as it is taken up as an emblem of the power of an idea-even one that is never realized in its intended form except, once again, after the fact.
Ayers then returns us to the issue of the book, already raised by Brooks: he asks how any concept of materiality can serve as a ground prior to the conceptualization of the thing as an object of study. Ayers focuses on the very notion of materiality as a catachrestic trope in otherwise sophisticated critical practices. Taking a traditional philological approach to the problem, he points to key moments in the varied histories of materialism where the cart of material certainty has been placed before the horse of interpretive practice. Rather than rejecting the wide array of critical discourses in which materiality has become a central term-including the long history of Marxist criticism and some forms of materialist feminism (most notably in the work of Judith Butler)-Ayers suggests that these critical practices would benefit from a ''skepticism toward matter.'' This provocative call for a reevaluation of the usefulness of matter as a category is intended to force critical discourse to abandon terms lacking explanatory power, especially terms that reinstate recognized idealizations. Just as Brooks draws attention to language (both abstract and material) as the container of meaning, Ayers reminds us that Derrida's argument that language is deferential rather than referential has yet to be substantially challenged. In terms of the book, as thing and as concept, he concludes that we must abandon the notion of the book as a coherent and static container of text at the same time that we return to the book as a crucial abstraction for cultural theory.
Part II: The Nature of Theory (to appear in 25, no. 1) approaches the central issues of the collection from the other direction, exploring how theoretical and critical discourses have an often-unacknowledged but crucially central aesthetic dimension as texts, formally complex objects in themselves. Sonja Laden and Jeffrey Pence examine contemporary criticism's turn toward material history, with unexpected conclusions. Laden explores the poetics of New Historicism's central trope, the anecdote, concentrating on the work of its central figure, Stephen Greenblatt. Arguing that Greenblatt's work is ''poetic,'' imaginative rather than descriptive or analytical, Laden claims that this particular form of New Historicism gains its explanatory power from its aesthetic character rather than its relation to actual history. Far from an empiricist brand of critical scholarship, Laden's poetic New Historicism need not have more than an atmospheric affinity with its historical subject. The practice of imaginative criticism that Laden describes is immune to the charge that it is either not historical enough or that it is not theoretical enough, as thing and theory merge in the final analysis into what is essentially a new work of art.
In his contribution, Jeffrey Pence argues for a critical category that he designates the spiritual. As Pence describes it, the spiritual is a nondogmatic exploration of the limits of the knowable. It is not to be confused with religion (particularly in the latter's adherence to traditional forms of authority) and so cannot be dismissed as a ''failed idealism.'' Nor, he argues, can it be understood as a kind of displaced or unconscious response to more mundane historical events. Because the experience of the spiritual is predicated upon an unstructured, open-ended response to the unknowable, Pence argues, it defies conventional critical approaches; the critic is able to gain access to this domain of experience only by embracing the openness that the spiritual work of art itself illustrates. Pence locates a conspicuous example of such spiritual art in Lars von Trier's Breaking the Waves, a film which attempts to take seriously the mystical experiences of its female protagonist. Pence frames his discussion of the film with an overview of the role that demystification has played in realist film criticism, and he contrasts that with the tradition of the sublime, which he finds in its most articulate form in the work of Lyotard. Against the dismissals or historicizing moves of more skeptical critics, Pence argues that appreciating the film requires sensitizing critical language to the sublime material that it must fail to fully comprehend or express. For Pence, this challenge must be constantly posed and answered anew with each change of the critical scene.
If the material and the conceptual are blurring anywhere in social or intellectual life today, certainly it is in electronic or digital culture that we see these transformations most explicitly. N. Katherine Hayles's contribution begins with the premise that centuries of print culture resulted in a blindness to the material dimensions of literary experience and aesthetics, which new technologies of textual production, distribution, and consumption have now made us retroactively aware of. She is particularly interested in establishing the features specific to a new literary form, electronic hypertext. More generally, however, Hayles wants to combine an awareness of the difference a medium makes-both to what it conveys and to those who interact with it-with a subtle understanding that perceived qualities can migrate from their medium of origin to other media, making media-specific analysis as bound to careful reading and interpretation as it is to the ''objective'' qualities of the specific media in question. In this way, Hayles manages to argue against dogmatic analyses based on any simple distinction between the literary text and its medium while stressing the importance of attending to medium in interpretative practice. Nevertheless, this concern with materiality does not amount to materialism per se. Rather, Hayles's anatomy of hypertext operates by enacting a heuristic of reading, working between form and materiality both at the level of the general (hypertext) and the specific (the many examples). Between matter and form, between thing and theory, we find media-specific analysis.
